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Abstract—In present-day highly-automated vehicles, there are
occasions when the driving system disengages and the human
driver is required to take-over. This is of great importance
to a vehicle’s safety and ride comfort. In the U.S state of
California, the Autonomous Vehicle Testing Regulations require
every manufacturer testing autonomous vehicles on public roads
to submit an annual report summarizing the disengagements of
the technology experienced during testing. On 1 January 2016,
seven manufacturers submitted their first disengagement reports:
Bosch, Delphi, Google, Nissan, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, and
Tesla Motors. This work analyses the data from these disen-
gagement reports with the aim of gaining abetter understanding
of the situations in which a driver is required to takeover, as
this is potentially useful in improving the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) Level 2 and Level 3 automation technologies.
Disengagement events from testing are classified into different
groups based on attributes and the causes of disengagement are
investigated and compared in detail. The mechanisms and time
taken for take-over transition occurred in disengagements are
studied. Finally, recommendations for OEMs, manufacturers, and
government organizations are also discussed.
Index Terms—Automated vehicle, Disengagement, human-
vehicle interactions, take-over operation, vehicle testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
AUTOMATED vehicles have been gaining increasing at-tention from both academia and industry [1]. The field of
automated vehicles is multidisciplinary, involving transporta-
tion system, automotive engineering, human factors, infor-
mation technology, control, robotics, communications, energy,
security, and social sciences [2]−[5].
While fully autonomous driving is often considered the “end
goal”, intermediate “highly automated” vehicles (HAVs) that
Manuscript received February 28, 2017; accepted September 29, 2017.
This work was supported by Jaguar Land Rover and the UK-EPSRC grant
EP/ N012089/1 as part of the jointly funded Towards Autonomy: Smart and
Connected Control (TASCC) Programme. Recommended by Associate Editor
Fei-Yue Wang. (Corresponding author: Dongpu Cao.)
Citation: C. Lv, D. P. Cao, Y. F. Zhao, D. J. Auger, M. Sullman, H. J.
Wang, L. M. Dutka, L. Skrypchuk, and A. Mouzakitis, “Analysis of autopilot
disengagements occurring during autonomous vehicle testing,” IEEE/CAA J.
of Autom. Sinica, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 58−68, Jan. 2018.
C. Lv, D. P. Cao, Y. F. Zhao, D. J. Auger, M. Sullman, and H.
J. Wang are with the School of Aerospace, Transport and Manufactur-
ing, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedford, MK43 0AL, UK (e-mail:
c.lyu@cranfield.ac.uk; d.cao@cranfield.ac.uk; yifan.zhao@cranfield.ac.uk;
d.j.auger@cranfield.ac.uk; m.sullman@cranfield.ac.uk; huaji.wang@cranfield.
ac.uk).
L. M. Dutka, L. Skrypchuk, and A. Mouzakitis are with Jaguar
Land Rover, Coventry, CV3 4LF, UK (e-mail: lmillen@jaguarlandrover.com;
lskrypch@jaguarlandrover.com; amouzak1@jaguarlandrover.com).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available
online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JAS.2017.7510745
are capable of driving autonomously in some scenarios (but
not all) are likely to arrive sooner: HAVs the next few years.
In support of this, the USA’s National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) issued its “Federal Automated Ve-
hicles Policy” in September, 2016. In this document, the
NHTSA adopted the approach of SAE for describing levels
of vehicle automation. The SAE definitions divide vehicles
into six levels based on “who does what, when” [6], [7]. SAE
Level 1 corresponds to “driver assistance” systems; SAE Level
4 describes vehicles with “high automation” with the ability to
manage safety-critical functions such as steering, accelerating
and braking.SAE Level 2 (“partial automation”) and Level
3 (“conditional automation”) represent the transitional region
between driver assistance and high automation, and they are
a significant focus of emerging work.
In Level 2 and Level 3 automation, the driver cedes longi-
tudinal and lateral control of the vehicle to a varying degrees
[8].When there are driving tasks that the vehicle’s automation
systems can no longer handle, the automated control mode
disengages and control authority is given back to the driver.
The disengagement process, along with the take-over (TO)
operation, is of key importance and greatly affects automated
vehicle’s safety and comfort. To address these challenges in
driver-vehicle interactions at Level 2 and Level 3 automation,
many researchers have explored advanced driver assistance
systems (ADAS) and human-machine interfaces (HMIs) from
a variety of viewpoints [9]−[12]. However, disengagement
events and their associated take-over events have rarely been
investigated in real vehicle testing scenarios.
The US state of California is noted for its encouragement of
autonomous vehicle technology and it allows manufacturers
to perform testing on public roads. California’s Autonomous
Vehicle Testing Regulations require every manufacturer testing
vehicles on the state’s public roads to submit an annual report
summarizing the disengagements experienced during testing.
These disengagement reports are due by January 1 of each
year. Seven manufacturers, namely Bosch, Delphi, Google,
Nissan, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, and Tesla Motors
submitted their first disengagement reports on January 1,
2016 [13]−[19]. To better understand the mechanisms of
driver-vehicle interactions during the disengagement process,
and to improve the Level 2 and Level 3 automation technology,
this paper reviews the seven publicly reported disengagement
files. The disengagement events with their various causes are
investigated and compared in detail. Take-over mechanism
and time are also examined through the vehicle tests. These
findings shed light on the refinement of automated technology
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and driver-automation collaboration.
To present the details, the rest of this paper is arranged as
follows: Section II defines and classifies the disengagement
events focused on in this study, and presents the overall
conditions of the disengagement reported by manufacturers;
Section III analyses the main reasons of these disengagements;
Section IV discusses the disengagement cases of stage-I and
stage-II manufacturers, respectively; Section V investigates the
take-over mechanism and time reported in the disengagements;
Section VI proposes recommendations to original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), manufacturers, and government orga-
nizations, respectively, and discusses the opening challenges
associated with driver-vehicle interactions; Section VII con-
cludes the findings and discusses possible future work.
II. DISENGAGEMENT OVERVIEW
A. Definition of Disengagement
The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) rule
defines the disengagement which needs to be reported as a
deactivation of the autonomous mode when a failure of the
autonomous technology is detected, or when the safe operation
of the vehicle requires that the autonomous vehicle test driver
disengages autonomous mode and takes immediate manual
control of the vehicle [20].
Remark 1: The above definition is necessary to ensure
that manufacturers are not reporting every common or routine
disengagement. And since these reported disengagements refer
to those immediate ones, the automated technology where
disengagements events occurred corresponds to SAE Level 2
automation, rather than Level 3 (Level 3 automation is able
to give driver a sufficiently comfortable transition time to take
over the manual control).
B. Classification of Disengagement
The above defined disengagements of autonomous mode can
be divided into:
1) Passive disengagement (PDE): When a failure of the
autonomous technology is detected, disengagement is required
by the automation system, and the driver undertakes an im-
mediate take-over.
2) Active disengagement (ADE): Automation system does
not recognize any failure, but the driver monitors the situation
and actively takes an immediate manual control of the vehicle,
disengaging the autonomous mode.
C. Overview of Automated Testing and Disengagements
An overview of the number of disengagements, with the
number of automated driving miles for the seven manufactur-
ers (represented as A-G), are listed below.
1) Manufacturer A reported 341 disengagements in 424 331
miles driven [15];
2) Manufacturer B reported 405 disengagements in 16 662
miles driven [14];
3) Manufacturer C reported 261 disengagements in 14 945
miles driven [18];
4) Manufacturer D reported 1031 disengagements in 1739
miles driven [17];
5) Manufacturer E reported 106 disengagements in 1485
miles driven [16];
6) Manufacturer F reported 625 disengagements in 935
miles driven [13];
7) Manufacturer G reported zero disengagements (No test-
ing on public streets) [19].
Based on the results in Fig. 1, Company A is along way
ahead in terms of autonomous vehicle testing miles on public
roads. Detailed data can be found in Table I. As the automated
driving technology being developed and refined constantly, for
most of these manufacturers, the number of disengagements
occurring each month is steadily decreasing over time, as
shown in Fig. 2. The number of these disengagements, each
month, by company can be found in Table II.
Fig. 1. Automated driving miles on public roads for the six companies.
The environments that the automated cars operate are very
important. Mastering autonomous driving in various condi-
tions, including different locations, weather, and multi-type
road surfaces, requires the automated technology to be smart
and robust enough to handle all possible road circumstances
[21], [22].
1) Locations: Street, Interstate way, freeway/highway; rural
road, parking facility.
TABLE I
REPORTED AUTOMATED TESTING MILES ON PUBLIC ROADS
Company Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14 Jan-15 Feb-15 Mar-15 Apr-15 May-15 Jun-15 Jul-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15 Nov-15 Total
A 4207.2 23 971.1 15 836.6 9413.1 18 192.1 18 745.1 22 204.2 31 927.3 38 016.8 42 046.6 34 805.1 38 219.8 36 326.6 47 143.5 43 275.9 42 4331
B N/A N/A 112.7 366.6 117.7 16.4 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 374.9 492.1 16 661
C 1026.5 910.31 6405.09 4375.7 1312.33 160.94 121.79 3.11 99.42 45.36 31.07 329.95 124.27 N/A N/A 14 945.84
D N/A 1291 1164 1136 456 3941 6604 64 80 242 471 632 491 41 48 1739.08
E N/A N/A N/A 92.5 236.2 51.2 N/A 131.1 30.8 N/A 91.3 108.8 93.1 65.5 34.6 1485.4
F 107.65 288 706.46 42.81 29.43 38.9 18.3 47 55.1 171.63 119.82 22.17 18.72 29.59 43.5 935.1
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TABLE II
REPORTED NUMBER OF DISENGAGEMENTS DURING AUTOMATED TESTING
Company Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14 Jan-15 Feb-15 Mar-15 Apr-15 May-15 Jun-15 Jul-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15 Nov-15 Total
A 2 19 21 43 53 14 30 51 13 11 29 7 16 16 16 341
B N/A 39 43 107 35 10 79 11 6 9 13 7 6 12 28 405
C 18 68 101 56 15 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 N/A N/A 261
D 44 244 189 36 48 16 39 72 34 127 69 24 50 17 22 1031
E N/A N/A 7 32 31 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 28 8 106
F N/A 0 0 126 86 21 0 83 10 0 40 35 27 103 94 625
Fig. 2. Number of disengagements by month.
2) Weather: Sunny, cloudy, rainy, clear (night) [16].
3) Road surface conditions: Dry, wet, poor road conditions
with holes or bumps [17], poor lane markings, such as faded
markings, and freshly paved roadway [14].
In order to comprehensively evaluate automated driving
miles and disengagements, “miles per disengagement (MPD)”
is adopted as an indicator to evaluate the maturity of the
autonomous technology. MPD is defined as follows.
MPD =
S
n
(1)
where S is the automated driving miles during testing, and n
is the number of disengagements occurred during testing.
According to Fig. 3, at the end of 2015 the MPD of Com-
pany A remains stable at around 3000, while other companies’
MPDs were typically within 100. Based on the MPD value,
we define two stages to indicate different maturities of Level
2 automation technology.
Fig. 3. Automated miles per disengagement of the six manufacturers.
Stage 1: MPD below 2000, indicating the initial stage of
Level 2 automation, with a lot of fundamental functions of
automated system needing to be refined and improved.
Stage 2: MPD above 2000, corresponding to the advanced
level with matured Level 2 automation system, approaching
Level 3 automation.
Thus, the six manufacturers covered in this report can be
clearly classified into two groups with different stages of
maturity in automated driving technology.
1) Stage-I manufacturers: B, C, D, E, and F;
2) Stage-II manufacturer: A.
III. MAIN REASONS FOR DISENGAGEMENTS
Many factors can impact autonomous control performance,
and result in disengagements. These reasons include (but are
not limited to) those listed in Table III and Fig. 4.
TABLE III
CAUSES OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF DISENGAGEMENTS
PDE ADE
Hardware issues
Software failures
Weather conditions
Road surface conditions
Software limitations
Hardware issues
Emergencies
Precautionary intervention
Fig. 4. Main causes of PDEs and ADEs.
A. Typical causes of PDE
1) Hardware issues
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Hardware discrepancy indicates that a hardware element
failed or it is not performing as expected. Some typical
reported causes have been listed as follows.
A failure occurred in the vehicle controller [16];
Damage to sensors, wires, actuators, and other physical
devices.
2) Software issues
Software discrepancy covers inadequacies, involving issues
of environment perception, object recognition, vehicle po-
sitioning and localization, decision making, path planning,
trajectory generation, and vehicle control. Some typical causes
reported are:
Perceiving overhanging branches as an obstacle [15];
Another vehicle approached from the side but was unde-
tected by the perception system [16];
The recognition system lost the trajectory of the preced-
ing vehicle [16];
Generation of route goal failed [16];
Localization of the automated vehicle failed [16];
Position estimation logic failure caused the automated
vehicle to begin traveling outside of its lane [16];
Departure logic failed, and the automated vehicle would
not begin moving [16];
Problems with controller area network (CAN) bus data
rate and data transmission causing the automated control
to shut off [16];
Watchdog error;
System tuning and calibration [16].
3) Weather conditions
Problems with weather conditions during testing caused the
autonomous controller to shut off.
Traffic light detection fault due to poor lighting conditions
[16];
Object detection failure due to sun glare, rain, or twilight
[17];
Failures with poor visibility due to heavy rain, snow, fog,
etc.;
Failures with bright light, such as oncoming headlights
or direct sunlight;
Failures due to extremely hot or cold temperatures.
4) Road surface conditions
Problems causing autonomous control to shut off due to
poor road surface conditions.
Road with holes or bumps [17];
Poor lane markings, such as faded markings, and freshly
paved roadway [14].
B. Typical causes of ADE
Typical causes of ADE include software limitation, hard-
ware issues, emergencies, and precautionary interventions.
Detailed descriptions and related example cases are listed as
follows.
1) Software limitations
Although there was no failure detected, the automated
system was unable to handle high-stage tasks in complex situ-
ations, or object perceptions, vehicle’s trajectories, maneuvers,
and behaviors made by the automated system were undesirable
due to the limitation of software, resulting in an active take-
over. Some typical cases are:
Complete lane change in heavy traffic [14];
Too many pedestrians and vehicles at the intersection for
the system to predictably handle [16];
The automated vehicle moved uncomfortably close to a
parked car [15];
The automated vehicle drove too close to the left or right
side of the lane [16];
The automated vehicle did not recognize a vehicle that
stopped in front of it and failed to slow down [16];
A vehicle pulling out of a parking lot was not recognized
by the automated vehicle perception system [16];
System incorrectly recognized the preceding vehicle as a
vehicle in the next lane [16];
The automated vehicle began to merge into a lane behind
another vehicle very closely [16];
A vehicle stopped suddenly in front of the automated
vehicle at an intersection [16];
The automated vehicle was slowly encroaching on the
preceding vehicle [16];
The driver felt a delay in deceleration, so the driver took
over the brake operation [16];
The automated vehicle did not enter the correct lane [16].
2) Hardware issues
Hardware issues that made the driver feel to immediately
take over manual control of the vehicle.
3) Emergencies
Emergency situations that make the driver actively take over
the control authority of the vehicle from the automation system
for safety reasons. Typical cases include:
Emergency vehicles [14], [15] (To solve this issue, re-
cently Google proposed a system and method for detect-
ing and responding to emergency vehicles [23]);
Accidents or collisions [13];
Unexpected or reckless behaviors from other vehicles.
For example: While the automated vehicle was merging
autonomously, another vehicle approached in front of the
automated vehicle suddenly, and it was undetected by the
perception system; Another vehicle was about to rear-end the
automated vehicle due to sudden deceleration of the automated
vehicle.
4) Precautionary intervention
Problems causing autonomous control to shut off due to
poor road surface conditions.
To avoid construction zones [13]−[17];
To give extra space for a cyclist [14];
Precautionary intervention due to pedestrian traffic [14];
To ensure vehicle safety in bad weather conditions [17].
Remark 2: The above does not represent an exhaustive
list of situations that may interfere with proper operation of
automated control. In the initial stages of automated driving
(e.g., Level 1 and Level 2 automation), operators should never
completely depend on these components to remain safe. It is
the driver’s responsibility to stay alert, and be ready to take
control of the vehicle at all times.
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IV. CASE STUDY OF MANUFACTURERS
A. Analyses of Stage-II Disengagement (DE) Cases
As a leading company, the Stage-II manufacturer A’s dis-
engagement cases are presented in order to analyze the devel-
opment course of the automated driving technology.
1) An overview: The numbers of the Stage-II manufac-
turer’s PDE and ADE cases in each month have been listed
in Fig. 5. According to the data, PDEs dominate the disen-
gagement cases. After experiencing a significant increase with
almost 50 cases per month before May 2015, the amount
of PDEs start to decrease considerably, and remains table at
below 20 per month, indicating that the automation control
system has been gradually refined. In contrast, the number of
ADEs remains stable with less than 10 cases per month.
Fig. 5. Numbers of PDE and ADE for Company A each month.
Fig. 6 displays how the number of autonomous miles driven
between disengagements has changed over time. In general,
the number of autonomous miles between each disengagement
is increasing steadily. The rate of DE has dropped from 744
miles per disengagement in Q4 of 2014 to over 2800 miles
per disengagement in Q4 of 2015. Specifically, the rates of
PDE and ADE have dropped from 1026 miles and 3398 miles
per disengagement in the Q4 of 2014 to 5749 miles and 6878
miles per disengagement in Q4 of 2015, respectively. These
also demonstrate the gradual improvements and maturity of
the automated driving technology that company A achieved
during this period.
Fig. 6. Automated miles per disengagement for Company A each month.
2) PDE of Stage-II Manufacturer’s Cases: Taking a de-
tailed look at the data, the main reasons causing PDEs can be
placed into four categories, namely: hardware issues, software
failures, weather conditions, and road surface conditions. As
shown in Fig. 7, software failures dominate the PDE causes
each month. These software issues include initial stage prob-
lems of perception, decision making, and control, correspond-
ing to Level 1 and Level 2 automation functions. However, the
number of PDEs decreases significantly following April 2015,
indicating the continuous refinement and development of the
software.
Fig. 7. Company A’s PDEs causes by month.
According to Fig. 8, it can be clearly seen that the software
problems take up over 80 % of the proportion among the four
PDE reasons for failure during the entire testing process. Fur-
thermore,the proportion of hardware failures, poor weather and
road conditions are 13.97 %, 4.04 %, and 0.37 %, respectively.
Fig. 8. Proportion of different causes of Company A’s PDEs.
3) ADE of Stage-II manufacturer’s cases: The main causes
of ADE failures were software limitations, hardware issues,
emergencies, and precautionary interventions, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 9, it is software limitations that dominate
the causes of ADE each month. The number of ADEs
caused by software problems has not obviously decreased
during this period of time. This is because that these ADE
Fig. 9. Company A’s ADEs causes by month.
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software problems usually correspond to Level 3 Automation
functions, which is much more difficult to improve. Besides
this, the essence of disengagements caused by emergencies and
precautionary interventions are also closely related to software
limitations. Since the automation technology is not robust and
intelligent enough so far, the software lack capability to handle
advanced driving tasks in complex situations, such as tackling
emergencies. Thus, the human operators still do not fully trust
the automation control, and they intervene in some cases to
guarantee safety.
Fig. 10 shows that software problems account for over
75% of ADEs’. Combining software failures, emergencies and
precautionary interventions together account for 98% of ADE
cases.
Fig. 10. Proportion of each cause of Company A’s ADEs.
B. Detailed Analysis of Stage-I Manufacturers’ DE Cases
The numbers of disengagement events for the five Stage-
I companies manufactures are analysed together, in order to
find some commonalities and characteristics based on a larger
dataset.
1) An overview: Fig. 11 shows that PDE dominates the
disengagement cases in each month from Q4 of 2014 to Q1 of
2015. However, since Jan 2015, the absolute number of PDEs
steadily decreases to within 50 per month at the end of the
year.
Fig. 11. Number of PDE and ADE of Stage-I companies by month.
However, considering the distance driven, as shown in
Fig. 12, the overall automated driving miles of these five
Stage-I companies are less than 1/10 of Company A’s total
autonomous driving miles on public roads. Therefore, number
of autonomous miles between disengagements is only around
10 miles (Company A: around 2800 miles), which clearly
shows their immaturity in automated driving technology, and
also indicates the importance of on-road testing for the devel-
opment of highly automated vehicles.
Fig. 12. Automated miles per disengagement of Stage-I companies by
month.
2) PDE of Stage-I manufacturers’ cases: The reasons for
PDEs among Stage-I manufacturers are also due to hardware
issues, software failures, weather conditions, and road surface
conditions. As shown in Fig. 13, the most common cause was
software failures, but the other three causes always contributed
to the number of PDEs.
Fig. 13. PDE causes for Stage-I companies by month.
Based on the pie chart in Fig. 14, weather conditions and
road surface conditions account for over 9% of PDE cases,
indicating a deficiency in the Level 2 and Level 3 automation
functions of these Stage-I companies.
Fig. 14. Proportion of PDEs causes for Stage-I companies.
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3) ADE of Stage-I manufacturers’ cases: Based on the data
shown in Fig. 15, similar to Company A, software failures
were the most common causes of ADE in Stage-I manufac-
turers. As previously mentioned, the disengagements caused
by emergencies and precautionary intervention are actually
closely related to software failures.
Fig. 15. Causes of ADEs for Stage-I companies’ by month.
For Stage-I companies, which three causes account for
almost 100% of the ADEs (see Fig. 16). This phenomenon
shows the difficulty in developing high level automation tech-
nology, and also indicates the huge gap between their current
status and the high automation target of the Stage-I players.
Fig. 16. Proportion of different causes of Stage-I companies’ ADEs.
Remark 3: According to the above analysis, the software is-
sues or limitations are the main causes of the disengagements.
To improve and refine the software, manufacturers and other
entities should follow guidance, best practices, design princi-
ples, and standards developed by established standardization
organizations such as the International Standards Organization
(ISO) and SAE International [24]. The NHTSA also pointed
out that the automotive industry should monitor the evolution,
implementation, and safety assessment of artificial intelligence
(AI), machine learning, and other relevant software technolo-
gies and algorithms in order to improve the effectiveness and
safety of HAVs [17].
V. TAKE-OVER MECHANISM AND TIME
As long as there are situations that cannot be handled by
automation, the driver has to be available to take over the
driving task in a safe manner. Research on the mechanism
and elapsed time of the take-over actions can help us to better
understand at which point a driver’s attention must be directed
back to the driving task, and to synthesize suitable shifting
control algorithms.
A. Take-Over Mechanism
A take-over action can either be requested by the automation
system or directly triggered by manual input from driver or
operator.
1) Take-over request: The take-over request is usually
alerted through distinct audio and/or visual feedback after
failures have been detected, indicating that immediate manual
control is needed by the driver.
2) Take-over operation: After receiving the take-over re-
quest alerted by the automation system, or when the driver
wants to manually control the vehicle, the take-over transition
can be triggered by driver through actions, including pressing
the auto/manual switch, or manipulating the steering wheel,
brake or accelerator. The take-over processes of each manu-
facturer are outlined below.
a) Manufacturer A: the test driver is given a distinct au-
dio and visual signal, indicating that immediate take-over is
required [15].
b) Manufacturer B: any hardware failure triggers a buzzer
to alert the vehicle operator that he/she needs to take over.
The vehicle operator always has one hand on the steering
wheel and one hand on the auto/manual toggle switch on the
vehicle’s central console. Pressing the auto/manual switch kills
all power to the automated system actuators (throttle, steering,
brakes, and shifter) and allows the operator to instantaneously
take full control [14].
c) Manufacturer E: test driver is alerted to technology
failure, or the driver actively overrides the system with man-
ual brake/accelerator/steering input, causing the controller to
disengage [16].
d) Manufacturer F: when a disengagement from automated
mode occurs, the driver is immediately alerted audibly and
visually and then immediately reassumes control. However,
reassuming control does not necessarily mean the driver must
apply an immediate, measurable input on the steering wheel,
brake or gas pedal or any other input device [13].
e) Manufacturer G: The warning is designed to provide
both visual and audible alerts. The automated system does not
attempt to apply the brakes or decelerate the vehicle. When
seeing and/or hearing a warning, it is the driver’s responsibility
to take corrective action immediately. Disengaging automated
control can be realized by pressing the brake or briefly pushing
the cruise control lever away from the driver [25].
B. Take-Over Time
In general, the take-over time can be defined as the period of
time elapsed from when the driver was alerted of a technology
failure to when the driver assumed manual control of the
vehicle [15]. Currently there is no standard methodology for
measuring the take-over time. Furthermore, manufacturers’
reports did not adequately describe their methods for logging
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this data. Take-Over elapse time reported in the disengagement
events of each manufacturer is reported in Table IV.
TABLE IV
TAKE-OVER TIME REPORTED IN DISENGAGEMENTS OF EACH
MANUFACTURER
TO time Company
A B C D E F
max 2.20 s < 1.00 s 21.00 s 7.95 s 4.00 s N/A
PDE min 0.20s < 1.00 s 0.00 s 0.00 s < 1.00 s N/A
avg. 0.84 s < 1.00 s 3.06 s∗ 0.86 s < 1.00 s N/A
ADE N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 s N/A
∗ In calculating the average take-over time of Manufacturer C’s DEs,
three extremely large recorded data, namely 29 s, 737 s, and 14 284 s, were
considered to be outliers and excluded [18].
1) Manufacturer A: Our test drivers are trained and prepared
for these events and the average driver response time for all
measurable events was 0.84 s [15].
2) Manufacturer B: In all cases that have a record of the
disengagement time, this time was measured as <1 s (no
detailed duration). In all remaining cases the disengagement
time was recorded as N/A [14].
3) Manufacturer C: The average take-over time was 3.06 s
[18].
4) Manufacturer D: In general, the average recorded re-
action time in disengagement cases was 0.875 s. However,
according to the details of their report, only automatic dis-
engagements recorded the reaction time, while the reaction
time of disengagements was not provided [19].
5) Manufacturer E: Generally less than 1s on average. In
all the driver over ride cases, the time was recorded as 0 s; in
almost all the cases of automation system fails, the time was
recorded as <1 s. In one exception the elapsed time was 4 s.
6) Manufacturer F: We are unable to measure the time
period for every single disengagement because not all driving
situations require measurable driver input. Our test vehicle
safety approach, therefore, includes the process of transition
from automated to manual mode in a specific test driver
training. Only trained drivers are allowed to operate a test
vehicle and they constantly monitor the vehicle’s operation.
This safety approach has been reviewed by an independent
3rd party safety organization [13].
Remark 4: Although most of the average values of the
reported take-over time are within 1 s, a take-over transition is
never an easy task that can be rapidly and easily completed.
In all reported automated vehicle tests the test drivers were
well-trained and experienced ones, who were concentrating
and prepared to take over the vehicle’s control. However, in
daily life driving, we are unable to guarantee all the drivers
are well trained and concentrate enough to resume the manual
control so quickly. Furthermore, the take-over performance is
closely related to driving scenarios, driver’s workload, atten-
tion, drowsiness, whether they have situational awareness, etc.
Thus, how to accurately detect driver’s behaviors and attention,
and the design of the HMI remain important challenges
that require exploring. The NHTSA also pointed out that
manufacturers and other entities should consider whether it is
reasonable and appropriate to incorporate driver engagement
monitoring into Level 3 HAV systems [17].
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Disengagement is a key indicator reflecting the maturity
of the automated driving technology. Based on the above
analyses, we believe that different types of disengagements
correspond to distinguished maturity stages of the developed
automation technology.
As shown in Fig. 17, PDE and ADE fit the characteristics
in between Level 2 and Level 3 automation. Specifically, PDE
corresponds to the initial development stage of Level 2. Ad-
equately resolving PDE failures will lead to the manufacturer
reaching the maturity-I stage of Level 2 automation. Beyond
PDE, those ADE cases can be mapped into the higher stages
of Level 2. The causes of ADEs usually indicate more difficult
to solve problems of the automated functions. If the ADEs’
issues can be well handled, the technology is almost reaching
Level 3 automation.
Fig. 17. Relations between reported disengagements and automation levels.
A. Recommendations
Based on the above analysis, in order to help develop and
refine automated driving technologies, especially the Level 2
and Level 3 automation technologies, some recommendations
for OEMs, manufacturers, and government organizations are
provided below.
1) For OEMs: Disengagement with driver take-over is a
complex process which is crucial to driving safety and ride
comfort during automated driving. According to the analysis
of disengagement data, the dominant causes for both PDE
and ADE are software issues, which cover the inadequacies
of perception, decision making, path planning, and vehicle
control. Heading toward higher automation, the performance
and robustness of the software needs to be improved urgently.
OEMs should follow a robust software design and validation
process based on a systems-engineering approach with the goal
of designing HAV systems free of unreasonable safety risks.
Also as the NHTSA recommended, OEMs should monitor the
evolution, implementation, and safety assessment of artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and other relevant software
technologies and algorithms to improve the effectiveness and
safety of HAVs [6].
In addition, understanding the interaction between the ve-
hicle and the driver is of great importance. Especially in
systems of SAE Level 2 and Level 3, human drivers are
expected to return to the driving tasks and take over driving
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responsibilities, but drivers’ ability to do so is limited by
human capacity to stay vigilant when disengaged from the
driving task. OEMs should consider how to incorporate driver
attention, inattention, and engagement monitoring into auto-
mated systems. Furthermore, how HAVs will signal intentions
to the environment around the vehicle, including pedestrians,
bicyclists, and other vehicles, these factors should also be con-
sidered by OEMs documented processes for the assessment,
testing, and validation of the vehicle HMI are needed.
2) For manufacturers: For integrating all the components
in an automated vehicle, manufacturers should suitably de-
termine their system’s AV level in conformity with SAE
International’s published definitions. For all HAV systems,
the manufacturer should address the cross-cutting items as a
vehicle or equipment is designed and developed to ensure that
HMI design best practices have been followed; that appropriate
crash/occupant protection has been designed into the vehicle;
and that consumer education and training have been addressed
[6].
Especially for handling the disengagements with human
driver take-overs, manufacturers should have a documented
process for transitioning to a minimal risk condition when a
problem is encountered. HAVs operating on the road should
be capable of detecting HAV system issues, and informing
the human driver in a way that enables the driver to regain
adequate control of the vehicle as swiftly and safely as possi-
ble. Fall back strategies should take into account that human
drivers may be inattentive, under the influence of alcohol or
other substances, drowsy, or physically impaired in some other
manner. The fall back actions should be administered in a
manner that will facilitate safe operations of the vehicle and
minimize erratic driving behavior, and should also minimize
the effects of errors in human driver recognition and decision-
making during and after transitions to manual control. Besides
this, disengagement events should also be well analysed and
utilized after happening. A good example is given by Google.
They employs a powerful simulator that allows them to
“replay” each disengagement with the behavior of the vehicle
as well as the behavior and positions of other road users in
the vicinity [15].
3) For government organizations: Government organiza-
tions play an important role in facilitating automated vehicles,
such as ensuring they are safely deployed, and promoting their
life-saving features.
To help develop and improve automated technology, govern-
ments should retain their traditional responsibilities for vehicle
licensing and registration, traffic laws and enforcement, and
motor vehicle insurance and liability regimes for automated
vehicles. More testing areas and facilities should be established
and upgraded for supporting the development of automated
technology [6].
Adequate education and training is imperative to ensure safe
deployment of automated vehicles. Apart from manufacturers
and other entities, government organizations should also de-
velop and organise activities, such as education and training
programs, workshops,and vehicle demonstrations, to helping
civics address the basic principles of automated vehicles,
and the anticipated differences in the use and operation of
automated vehicles from those of conventional vehicles that
the public owns and operates today.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to better understand driver-vehicle interactions, and
help improve Level 2 and Level 3 automation technology, this
paper reviewed seven disengagement files reported by major
companies that ran automated vehicle tests on public roads.
The definition of the disengagement events focused in this
study was claimed at first. Based on their different attributes,
the disengagement events were classified into two types,
namely PDE and ADE. The overall conditions of the disen-
gagement reported by manufacturers were presented. Then,
the main reasons of disengagement events were revealed.
Among these reasons, the software issues and limitations were
the most common. Cases of manufacturers’disengagements
were also investigated in detail. The take-over mechanism and
time reported in each company’s disengagement events were
discussed. Based on the analyses, recommendations to OEMs,
manufacturers, and government organizations have been pro-
vided. Future work will include a comparison of the present
disengagement data with those published in the following
year, an investigation of driver attention and cognition when
interacting with automated driving, and the development of
haptic feedback HMI which considers driver cognition state.
APPENDIX
NOMENCLATURE
ADE Active disengagement
ADAS Advanced driver assistance systems
AI Artificial intelligence
DMV Department of motor vehicles
HAV Highly automated vehicle
HMI Human-machine interface
ISO International Standards Organization
MPD Miles per disengagement
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
OEM Original equipment manufacturer
PDE Passive disengagement
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
TO Take-over
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